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EU imports of oranges are restricted not only by ad valorem tariffs but also by the entry price 
system establishing a minimum import price. In addition, the EU applies a comprehensive 
system of trade preferences. The hypothesis of this paper is that, in contrast to its complexity, 
the effectiveness of the EU import system for oranges is low with respect to its goals, i.e. 
protecting EU producers on the one hand and creating imports from preference receiving 
countries on the other. 
The comparison of import prices for oranges from extra-EU countries with the EU entry price 
shows that the former are about 40% higher than the latter on average. Also, it is pointed out 
that at least 72% of extra-EU orange imports during the EU harvest season enter the EU tariff 
free. As a conclusion, the contribution of the import regime to the protection of EU producers 
is low. 
Concordantly, the preferential entry price is not utilized by orange preference receiving 
countries. Besides, although orange quotas increased from 1991 to 2003, actual exports from 
Mediterranean countries and thus quota filling rates have decreased over the same period. It is 
shown that EU trade preferences for oranges were not decisive for the development of 
Mediterranean countries' orange exports to the EU. In the light of the low effectiveness of the 
entry price system for oranges along with high transaction costs involved, its abolishment 
should be considered. Yet, results cannot be generalized, even not for citrus fruit, as is 
demonstrated for mandarins. 
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EU imports of oranges are restricted not only by an ad valorem tariff but also a de facto 
minimum import price which is established by the EU entry price system. In addition, the EU 
applies a comprehensive system of trade preferences, especially for orange imports 
originating in developing countries. 
The motivation of the EU’s external market regulations for oranges is to protect EU producers 
by mitigating international price competition while creating an EU market price which is 
higher than the world market price. In contrast to this, trade preferences are intended by the 
EU to create imports from the preference receiving countries.  
This paper analyzes the relationship between the EU entry price and the actual EU market 
price for oranges, indicating that the market price is substantially higher than the entry price. 
In addition, it is shown that EU trade preferences for oranges are highly complex. They are 
specified, negotiated and repeatedly revised for each preferred trading partners individually. 
However, findings suggest that the degree of their utilization is rather low.  
The results of this study demonstrate that, in contrast to its complexity, the effectiveness of 
the EU import system is low with respect to its goals, i.e. protecting EU producers on the one 
hand and creating imports from the preference receiving countries on the other. In the event of 
the conclusion of the Doha round trade negotiations the effectiveness of the import regime 
will further diminish. Before the background of high transaction costs caused by the entry 
price system, the full liberalization of orange imports of the EU should be considered as an 
alternative. 
In this paper we proceed as follows. Section two describes EU orange imports and import 




system and the preferential orange quotas. Section four draws some summarizing conclusions 
and puts our results in perspective. 
2 EU imports of oranges 
2.1 Trade flows 
The EU is the largest orange importer in the world. In 2003, EU orange imports amounted 
about 805,000t, equivalent to 23% of world orange imports (FAO, 2005). In addition, EU 
intra-trade of oranges, originating in the southern EU member countries Spain, Italy, Greece, 
and Portugal, accounted for about 1.6 million tons, of which 74% originate in Spain. 
The non-EU countries exporting oranges to the EU can be divided into northern and southern 
hemisphere suppliers, characterized by distinct orange export seasons. The major northern 
hemisphere suppliers are the Mediterranean countries (MED
2), which accounted for 88.4% of 
total EU orange imports from January to June in the period 1988-2004, and Cuba (Eurostat, 
various issues). In contrast, the orange export season of the primary southern hemisphere 
suppliers, including South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Zimbabwe and Swaziland lasts 
from June to November (Figure 1). 
The most important MED exporting oranges to the EU are Morocco and Israel. Both 
countries’ orange exports decreased markedly between 1988 and 2004 (Figure 2). Additional 
MED exporting oranges to the EU are Egypt, Cyprus, Tunisia and Turkey, with Cypriot 
orange exports to the EU exhibiting a decrease and Egyptian orange exports a recent increase. 
The MED’s orange exports to the EU represented 72% of EU imports from non-EU countries 
during the EU harvest season lasting from November 1 to May 31 in the period 1988 to 2004.  
                                                 
2 The MED countries comprise Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Palestine 
Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey, the countries covered by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Cyprus 

























Major northern hemisphere suppliers Major southern hemisphere suppliers
Major northern hemisphere suppliers: Morocco, Israel, Tunisia, Turkey, Cyprus, Egypt, Cuba; Major southern 
hemisphere suppliers: South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Zimbabwe, Swaziland; Sources: Eurostat  
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2.2 EU orange import policy 
2.2.1 Most favoured nation (MFN) policy 
The EU external market regulation for oranges includes a seasonally varying ad valorem 
tariff, with the highest tariff (16%) applied from October 16 to April 30 during the EU orange 
harvest season (see Table 1). In addition, an entry price system is in effect from December 1 
to May 31. In the event that the entry price is undercut, an additional specific tariff is levied, 
its size varying proportionately to the difference between the product’s actual import price 
and the entry price. The Maximum Tariff Equivalent (MTE) is the maximum specific tariff of 
71 Euro that is levied if the minimum entry price is undercut by 8% or more. This MTE is 
equivalent to 20.1% of the entry price. 
Table 1: EU MFN import regime for oranges  
Specific tariff  
 
MFN ad valorem 
tariff (%) 
MFN entry 
price (€)  MTE (€/t)  in % of MFN 
entry price 
01.01.-31.03.  16.0 354  ≤ 71  20.1 
01.04.-30.04.  10.4 354  ≤ 71  20.1 
01.05.-15.05.  4.8 354  ≤ 71  20.1 
16.05.-31.05.  3.2 354  ≤ 71  20.1 
01.06.-30.09.  3.2 -  -   
01.10.-15.10  3.2 -  -   
16.10.-30.11.  16.0 -  -   
01.12.-31.12.  16.0 354  ≤ 71  20.1 
   
Sources: European Commission (2005a), own calculations. 
 
The EU orange import system has been changed substantially in the course of the 
implementation of the results of the Uruguay Round. Ad valorem tariffs for oranges were 
reduced by 20% between 1995 and 2001, and the former reference price system was replaced 
by the entry price system as of December 1995. The MFN entry price for oranges introduced 
on December 1995 was 34.3% higher than the former reference price. This rise in the 




abolition of the market penetration premium
3 that had been introduced following the EU 
accession of Spain and Portugal. Following its introduction in 1995, the MFN entry price for 
oranges was reduced slightly by 4% until 2001. 
In conclusion, the external EU market regulation for oranges exhibits great seasonal 
differences. Since 2001, northern hemisphere suppliers have been confronted with a 
significantly higher average ad valorem tariff (10.9% during their main export season from 
January to June) than southern hemisphere suppliers (4.3% throughout their export season 
from June to November). Southern hemisphere suppliers are confronted with a substantial ad 
valorem tariff from October 16 to November 31 exclusively, amounting to 16% since 2001. 
Also, northern hemisphere suppliers have to comply with the entry price system from January 
to May, thus during almost their complete export season, whereas the entry price system is 
not at all effective during the southern hemisphere suppliers’ season.  
 
2.2.2 Trade preferences  
The EU grants trade preferences for oranges mainly to the MED, who are the major northern 
hemisphere orange suppliers to the EU. Zimbabwe and Swaziland are the only southern 
hemisphere suppliers that enjoy preferential access to the EU orange market. Since 2000, this 
preference takes the form of a reduction of 80% in the ad valorem tariff.  
Preferential access to the EU orange market might induce a competitive advantage for the 
preference receiving country’s exporters against non-preference receiving countries’ 
exporters. Also, trade preferences might reduce the competitive disadvantage of the 
preference receiving country’s exporters relative to the EU’s domestic suppliers. In particular, 
a preferential tariff may increase exporters’ profits by raising the export price. A preferential 
                                                 
3 Market penetration premiums, a policy instrument to subsidize orange production, were paid to orange 
growers on class I orange exports to other EU member countries prior to December 1995 (Swinbank and 




entry price might allow utilizing a cost advantage if the produce can profitably be supplied to 
the EU market at a price below the MFN entry price. 
The development of EU trade preferences for Morocco, Israel, Egypt and Tunisia is very 
similar. Those countries were first granted preferential access to the EU market under 
individual Cooperation Agreements in the 1970s; these preferences take the form of ad 
valorem tariff reductions that vary between 60% to 80% (Table 2). In 1986, the Cooperation 
Agreements were amended by Additional Protocols to compensate for the relative 
degradation of agricultural trade preferences due to the EU accession of Portugal and Spain. 
Under these protocols, ad valorem tariffs were reduced analogously to the tariff reduction for 
Spain and Portugal from 1989 on, but limited quantitatively by tariff rate quotas (TRQs) since 
1991. These TRQs initially varied between 293,000t for Israel and 7,000t for Egypt. Orange 
exports exceeding the quantity specified by the TRQ were subject to the tariff reduction rate 
as established by the initial Cooperation Agreements. In the ensuing years, TRQs slightly 
increased, and in January 1993 the ad valorem tariff within the TRQ was abolished 
completely to coincide with the tariff cancellation for Spanish and Portuguese orange exports. 
Entry price quotas (EPQs) which allow a restricted quantity to be exported to the EU at a 
reduced entry price as well as a zero tariff rate, were introduced for Morocco and Israel 
concurrently with the transformation of the reference price into the entry price system in 
December 1995. Thus, these trading partners were not concerned by the large increase in the 
entry price compared with the former reference price (see 2.2.1). Instead, the preferential 
entry price for oranges in 1995/96 was set equal to the former reference price, amounting to 
74.6% of the MFN entry price (Table 3). It was successively reduced by 4% until 2001, 
parallel to the reduction of the MFN entry price. For Egypt, an EPQ was established in 




Table 2: Development of EU preferences for primary northern hemisphere orange exporters, 1988-2004 (quotas in tons) 
 
Policy 
instrument  1988  1989  1990  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Tariff red. 
in/bey. quota 80%  as for Port. & Spain due to EU accession 
/ 80%  100% / 80% 
TRQ 0  265,000  272,950  280,900  288,850  292,825  296,800  340,000  0 
EPQ 0  300,000 
Morocco 
Total quota  0  265,000  272,950  280,900  288,850  292,825  596,800  640,000  300,000 
Tariff red. 
in/bey. quota 60%  as for Port. & Spain due to EU accession 
/ 60%  100%/ 60% 
TRQ 0  293,000  301,790  310,580  323,705  328,100  0 
EPQ 0  200,000 201,500 
Israel 
Total quota  0  293,000  301,790  310,580  323,705  328,100  200,000  201,500 
Tariff red. 
in/bey. quota 60%  as for Port. & Spain due to EU accession 
/ 60%       100%/ 60% 
TRQ 0  7,000  7,210  7,420  7,630  7,735  7,840  0 
EPQ 0  8,000 50,000 
Egypt 
Total quota  0  7,000  7,210  7,420  7,630  7,735  7,840  15,840  50,000 
Tariff red. 
in/bey. quota 80%  as for Port. & Spain due to EU accession 
/ 80%  100%/ 80% 
TRQ  0  28,000  30,940 31,360 32,301 33,242 34,183  35,124 
EPQ  0 
Tunisia 
Total  quota  0  28,000  30,940 31,360 32,301 33,242 34,183  35,124 
Tariff red. 
in/bey. quota 40%  stepwise increase between Dec. 87 and Dec. 97  100% 
TRQ  0 
EPQ 0  48,200 
Cyprus 
Total quota  0  48,200 
Tariff red. 
in/bey. quota 100% 
TRQ  0 
EPQ  0 
Turkey 
Total quota  0 
All MED 
suppliers  Total  quota  0  593,000 609,950 626,900 648,185 659,600 836,000 893,141 894,082 895,023 939,164 939,164 939,164 939,164 634,824 
a Malta, Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Palestine are no relevant orange exporters to the EU and are therefore not included in the table. 




Spain and Portugal had to comply with the reference price until December 1993. In the 
second phase of EU accession transition (January 1990 to December 1993), oranges exported 
from Spain to the EU had to adhere with the reference price indirectly due to a compensation 
mechanism. In the event that the market price of Spanish oranges fell below the average EU 
supply price, which could not be lower than the reference price, Spanish exporters had to pay 
a compensation, equivalent to the difference between the reference price and the EU market 
price (OJ L302, 15.11.1985, Article 152). 
Between 1996 and 2004, the Cooperation Agreements were replaced by a series of Euro-
Mediterranean Agreements (EMAs). TRQs were increased for Morocco and Tunisia and were 
abolished for Israel and Egypt. In addition, EPQ increased significantly for Egypt. In the most 
recent agreements amending the EMAs between the EU and Israel as well as Morocco, TRQs 
were also eliminated for Moroccan oranges, and Israel’s EPQ was increased slightly. 
Table 3: Preferential entry price for oranges (in commercial ECU/€) 
 
Marketing year  94/95  95/96  96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05
MFN EP  27.5 (RP
*)  36.9 36.6 36.3 36.0 35.7 35.4 35.4 35.4 35.4 35.4 
Pref. EP  -  27.5 27.3 27.1 26.8 26.6 26.4 26.4 26.4 26.4 26.4 
% of MFN EP  -  74.5 74.6 74.7 74.4 74.5 74.6 74.6 74.6 74.6 74.6 
 
*RP = reference price; Source: European Commission (2005a). 
 
For Cyprus, a tariff reduction was granted under an Association Agreement in the 1970s. 
Subsequently the reduction rate gradually increased until the tariff was fully removed in 
December 1997. The tariff preference was supplemented by a preferential entry price, levied 
within an EPQ of 48,200t and established concurrently with the EPQ for Egypt in December 
1996. With Cyprus’ EU accession in 2004, trade barriers were completely eliminated.  For 
Turkey, the ad valorem tariff for orange exports to the EU was reduced under the 
Supplementary Protocol to the Association Agreement in 1981 and removed completely in 




Overall, total orange quotas granted by the EU to the MED orange suppliers amounted to 
593,000t in 1991, increasing to about 939,000t in 2000, and contracting to about 635,000t in 
2004, when the TRQ for Morocco was eliminated. 
To sum up, the MED exporting oranges to the EU can be classified according to the kind of 
orange trade preference they receive from the EU. Tunisia’s EU trade preference for oranges 
is confined to preferential ad valorem tariff reductions, partially limited by a TRQ. Turkey is 
granted tariff free access for an unlimited export quantity. The EU orange trade preferences 
granted to Morocco, Israel, and Egypt were initially confined to partially quantitatively 
limited tariff reductions, and later supplemented by EPQs. Cyprus enjoyed an EPQ from 1997 
until its EU accession in 2004. In conclusion, the EU import regime for oranges is highly 
complex and evolved in a multitude of separate agreements and regulations. Without doubt, it 
causes considerable transaction cost in policy design and administration as well as in its 
effects on trading companies. 
3 Analysis of the effectiveness of the EU import system for oranges 
3.1 Relationship between the EU import price and the entry price for oranges 
To analyze whether and how the EU entry price impacts prices and quantities of EU imports 
and thus the domestic orange market price, the standard import value (SIV) of oranges, an 
indicator for the import price, is compared to the entry price. The European Commission 
calculates the SIV daily based on the weighted average of wholesale market prices, surveyed 
by origin of the produce in different EU countries (for more details see Grethe and 
Tangermann, 1999 p. 15). 
Figure 4 depicts the SIV for oranges originating in the MED, the MFN entry price, and the 
preferential entry price that has been granted to Morocco and Israel since December 1995, and 




entry price is highest for Israel with 99.9%, followed by Cyprus with 98.7%, and lowest for 
Egypt with 79.1% (Table 4). The share of SIV observations below the preferential entry price  
Figure 4: SIV, MFN and preferential entry prices for oranges exported by the most   
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Sources: European Commission (2005a, 2005b). 
 
Table 4: Orange SIV in relation to MFN and preferential entry prices, December 1, 
       1995-May 31, 2005 






SIV as % of MFN 
EP (average) 
SIV as % of pref.
EP (average) 
Israel  961 99.9%  0.0%  158.3%  212.4% 
Tunisia  854 97.2%  0.2%  141.5%  185.8% 
Turkey  1,132 92%  0.7%  144.5%  193.8% 
Morocco  1,133 93%  0.0%  127.6%  171.1% 
Egypt  746 79.1%  4.0%  124.1%  166.5% 
Cyprus  613 98.7%  0.0%  144.4%  193.7% 
Total  5439 93.3%  0.6%  140.1%  187.9% 
 





is highest for Egypt with 4%, followed by Turkey (0.7%) and Tunisia (0.2%). The average 
difference between the SIV and the MFN entry price is highest for Israel (for which the SIV 
amounts to 158.1% of the MFN entry price), and lowest for Egypt (124.1%). Overall, the SIV 
is higher than the MFN entry price in 93.3% of the 5,439 total observations and the SIV is 
140.1% of the MFN entry price on average. This indicates that the entry price system is 
largely redundant. To check whether this result can be generalized, two other fruits are 
investigated. The size of the difference between the import price and the MFN entry price for 
oranges is exceeded by the corresponding difference for table grape exports from the MED to 
the EU (Figure 5). On average, the SIV for table grapes amounts 199.1% of the MFN entry 
price effective July 21 to November 20. 
Figure 5: SIV, MFN and preferential EP of MED exports of table grapes to the EU,     
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Sources: European Commission (2005a, 2005b). 
The situation for EU mandarin imports from the MED differs considerably. The SIV is below 
the MFN entry price (operative November 1 to the end of February) for Turkey in 60%, Egypt 
in 41% and Morocco in 33% of the surveyed cases for mandarins, although a preferential 




that Morocco also heavily capitalizes on the EPQ granted by the EU for Moroccan tomato 
exports. 
In summary, the EU import price for oranges is substantially higher than the EU MFN entry 
price, even for those countries which are granted a preferential entry price. This relationship is 
even more pronounced for EU imports of table grapes from MED. Thus, for oranges and 
grapes, the entry price system is by and large redundant. For mandarins and tomatoes, 
however, import prices are much closer to entry prices and the entry price system has an 
import restricting effect. 
Figure 6: SIV, MFN and preferential EP of MED exports of mandarins to the EU,  
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Sources: European Commission (2005a, 2005b). 
 
3.2 Development of the quota filling rate 
The volume of MED orange exports to the EU relative to the size of the corresponding orange 
quotas (TRQs and EPQs) is depicted in Table 5. Morocco’s and Egypt’s orange exports 
actually exceed their quotas in some years during the 1990s, but fall below afterwards. 




caused an increase of the filling rate in that year. Egypt exceeded its quota in 2002 to 2004 
due to the rise of Egyptian orange exports to the EU in this period. Tunisia’s quota filling rate 
varies between 48% and 75%. The rate for Cyprus is always below 50%. Israel exhibits the 
lowest filling rates, declining from 32% in 1991 to 12% in 2004. The unweighted average 
filling rate fell from over 100% in 1991 to 39% in 1999, but rose again to over 50% in 2002. 
Table 5: Orange quota filling rates (orange exports in % of quota) 
  1991  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Morocco  132  106 91 86 59 54 39 35 33 26 26 21 25 46
Israel  32  33 23 17 28 58 57 47 35 27 27 15 12 12
Cyprus  -  - - - - - 38 25 18 16 19  21  19 19
Egypt  279 347 264  92  184 105 61 54 50 68 95  170  195 114
Tunisia  75  69 72 73 73 64 45 69 61 69 61 61 48 53
Average   130  139 113 67 86 70 48 46 39 41 46 58 60 49
   
Sources: Eurostat (various issues), European Union (various issues), own calculations. 
 
Overall, while TRQs and EPQs for oranges originating in the MED countries were increasing 
following their introduction, the MED countries’ orange exports to the EU were decreasing 
(Figure 2). Therefore, the quota filling rate has fallen for most MED countries and the 
unweighted average quota filling rate has been 60% or less for all years since 1997. 
4 Discussion of results and conclusions 
The comparison of the import price for oranges originating in the MED countries with the EU 
MFN entry price shows that the former is about 40% higher than the latter on average. 
Furthermore, at least 72% of EU orange imports during the EU orange harvest season enter 
the EU tariff free. Hence, the contribution of the external market regulation to the protection 
of EU orange producers is low. In particular, the entry price system for oranges is of little 
effectiveness. 




preferential entry price reveals that preferential entry prices are not utilized by those countries 
which are eligible for one. This suggests that the MED countries do not have a comparative 
cost advantage vis-à-vis their competitors in the EU market, i.e. Spanish orange exporters. 
Indeed, EU importers report that prices of Moroccan and Israeli orange imports are 
significantly higher than the import price of Spanish oranges.  
Besides, although orange quotas increased from 1991 to 2003, actual exports from MED 
countries and thus quota filling rates have decreased over the same period. This indicates that 
the quantitative limitations of tariff and entry price reductions (TRQ and EPQs) are largely 
redundant. Thus, EU trade preferences for oranges are not decisive for the development of the 
MED’s orange exports to the EU. 
This implies that the liberalization of orange trade between the EU and the MED countries, 
which could be realized in the course of the ongoing Barcelona Process would induce few, if 
any, trade effects. Existing marketing standards for citrus fruits specifying minimum 
requirements regarding e.g. fruit size, external appearance, uniformity etc. would prevent 
inexpensive, low quality produce from entering the EU market, even if the EU entry price 
system were removed. 
Finally, the improvement of market access for Spain and Portugal due to their EU accession 
occurred almost parallel to the enhancement of preferences for the MED until 1993. This 
supports the conclusion that the development of trade preferences for the MED compared to 
market access conditions for Spain and Portugal was not decisive for the development of the 
MED’s orange exports to the EU up to 1993. Hence, factors beyond trade policy, such as 
transportation costs or quality, would appear to have caused the decline of the MED’s orange 
exports to the EU. 
Yet, as the results for mandarins demonstrate, these results cannot be generalized, not even 




entry price for mandarins would result in a decrease of the average EU import price level. 
Table grapes, however, provide a second example for which the SIV of imports from the 
MED is far above the EU entry price, and thus the entry price system is of little effect. 
The conclusion that large parts of the EU external trade regime for oranges are redundant will 
potentially be amplified by the current round of trade negotiations in the WTO. Negotiations 
on market access will probably result in significant tariff reduction rates which would also 
apply to the specific tariffs which are part of the EU’s entry price system. In implementing the 
results of the Uruguay Round, the EU reduced entry prices by the same monetary amount as 
specific tariffs – an approach which could be repeated and would thus further diminish the 
relevance of the EU entry price system. 
In the light of the low effectiveness of the EU import regime for oranges along with high 
transaction costs involved in its administration and further development, the unlimited and 
free access of the MEDs to the EU orange market could be considered as an alternative. This 
may be extended to grapes and possibly to other fruits and vegetables. In addition, the 
abolition of the entry price system for some products would reduce the incidence of a clear 
non tariff barrier to market access which has survived the Uruguay Round process of 
tariffication, but which is in clear conflict at least with its spirit. 
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